Restitution scholars are almost unanimous in rejecting the term quasi-contract. This essay challenges this view. It begins by demonstrating that many debates among restitution scholars are in fact debates about the boundaries of consent-based liability.This serves as an introduction to the main thesis advanced, which is that the idea of quasi-contract, which is supposed to cover cases in which the parties would have made a contract if conditions allowed them to do so, helps to explain the doctrine better than the conclusory language of unjust enrichment. The essay concludes by situating the argument within the growing literature on the normative foundations of restitution. It argues that quasi-contractual liability should be understood not as part of unjust enrichment, but as a different basis of liability that can help us see what liability for unjust enrichment might be: liability grounded in notions of fairness.
INTRODUCTION
The term 'quasi-contract', once used to describe the area of law now called 'restitution' or 'unjust enrichment', is now out of favour. Peter Birks, the preeminent restitution scholar of his generation, explained why:
'Quasi-contract' says only that the matter is not contract. So far as it suggests that there is a sort of contract, it deceives, unintelligibly.A quasi-sparrow is not a sparrow.
In what respect it might resemble sparrows is left to speculation ...A deceptive name is a constant impediment. 1 Talking about the close term of 'implied contract' Andrew Burrows was equally hostile. The notion, he argued, was fictional and said nothing about why the promise should be implied. By masking * *Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I presented an earlier version of this essay at a workshop in Osgoode Hall, and I thank participants there for their comments. For conversations on some of the issues discussed in this essay I also thank Prince Saprai. Finally, I thank two anonymous referees for the Modern Law Review for their comments.
the underlying basis for recovery the theory obscured the important similarities and differences between the cases reversing benefits received. Moreover it was contrary to the rule of law for judges to reach decisions without properly explaining their reasoning. 2 Strong words. But also, I think, quite problematic. One wonders, for instance, about Birks and Burrows's commitment to the elimination of fictions when both frequently use the concept of 'constructive trust', which wears its fictional nature on its sleeve. One wonders whether it is clarity of language that they are after when they both frequently use the term 'unjust enrichment' -Birks even used this term as the title of the book from which the quote comes -only to stress elsewhere how little their topic has to do with justice, with Birks going so far as to say that ' [b] ut for the need to retain a trace of normativity, one might just as well speak of pink enrichment'. 3 Burrows's claim that judges who relied on this term violated the rule of law by not explaining their reasoning is odder still. All those judges who presumably obscured their real reasoning by using the concept of 'quasi-contract' instead of the principle that supposedly really explained their decisions did so (one would think) according to their best understanding of the law, indeed by following what the law by everyone's reckoning at the time was.
How could doing so be a violation of the rule of law? Burrows faces a dilemma: if there is a separate principle of unjust enrichment that was part of the law even before it was endorsed by the courts, that would contradict his claim to be describing the law of restitution as it is found in the 'decided cases'. 4 But if the principle was not part of the law at the time, then the courts were not violating the rule of law by not following it. And if it is the obscurity of the labels that
Burrows is worried about, violating the rule of law by making its content incomprehensible to laypeople, one wonders how much sense the uninitiated will make of terms like 'negative benefit', 'incontrovertible benefit', 'free acceptance', 'subjective devaluation' and a host of others that are stock in trade for the contemporary restitution lawyer.
There is, however, perhaps a more plausible version of this criticism. In early treatments of the subject now known as restitution or unjust enrichment it was thought that the law of quasi-contract is filled by whatever is not contract and tort, including obligations arising from statute or judgment. 5 But telling us only that liability in this area should be treated 'as if it had a contractual origin', 6 by itself placed no constraint, not did it provide any guidance as to the content of the obligation in question. For those who worried that terms like 'unjust enrichment' or 'ex aequo et bono' would send the courts down the dangerous path of 'vague jurisprudence which is sometimes styled "justice as between man and man"', 7 quasi-contract may have seemed even more open-ended. In this essay I will nonetheless argue that if we are interested in making sense of the law, then the term 'quasi-contract' can actually be quite helpful and illuminating for understanding part of the law now classified as unjust enrichment. 8 One purpose of this essay, then, is clarificatory: I aim to show that on the issues in question the language of unjust enrichment can be obscuring, vacuous, and misleading. It is obscuring when it stands in the way of recognising the normative considerations that govern the cases at hand; it is vacuous when it does not provide any normative guidance; and it is misleading when it suggests remedies the law does not actually provide. I will argue that looking at those cases from a contractual perspective is helpful on all fronts. My more general and theoretical concern is to question some aspects of doctrinal scholarship and the focus it places on identifying the 'correct' taxonomy of legal rules by carefully attending to legal doctrine. This, I will argue, is a hopeless goal without a clearer understanding of the extra-legal normative issues at hand.
Here is how I plan to proceed. In the first section I argue that when examining the language and considerations used to determine whether liability should be imposed in many cases treated as examples of restitutionary liability, we see that they are better understood as cases about the limits of consent-based liability. I argue that considering these cases from a contractual perspective identifies the instances in which liability is imposed and those in which it is not better than the conclusory language of restitution. In the second section I examine the question of remuneration for assistance given at times of emergency. In this context I show that restitution law is not only unhelpful but is in fact misleading, for it cannot explain the remedies that are typically awarded in such cases. I use this type of case to argue that once we recognise the contractual element in them, we can develop a more precise set of conditions under which liability should be imposed. In these cases it would be appropriate to call the liability 'quasi-contractual', because it would be imposed in cases where there is no valid contract between the parties, but which are fruitfully analysed as though there is one. In the third section I turn from doctrinal details to the broader picture and consider the relevance of the preceding discussion to the question of the theoretical foundations of restitutionary liability, a topic that received considerable attention in recent years. I argue there that there is no reason to think that the foundation of the cases I considered earlier lies in the notion of corrective justice; instead I suggest that the normative basis of these cases should be traced to norms of fairness. I
show how considerations of fairness play a role in explaining why liability is imposed in quasi-contractual cases, and I suggest more tentatively what role fairness might have in underlying liability for unjust enrichment.
THE BOUNDARIES OF CONSENT
The general rule: no liability for unconsented services
The basic rule with regard to unconsented services is that the recipient is not liable to pay for the benefit he received. For instance, if you mistakenly think I asked for my house to be painted, and you did so while I was away, I do not have to pay you for the service, even if I like the house better now, and even if its market value has increased as a result. I do not have to pay even if I intended to get it painted in exactly the same way upon my return. At first blush this seems to be the exact opposite of the rule with regard to mistakes that confer benefits in kind. If you mistakenly send me a parcel that was intended to someone else, I do not thereby become the owner and you are entitled to get it back. Why does the law treat these cases so differently? Jack Beatson tried to solve this conundrum by arguing that in the case of unconsented services there is no enrichment. 9 But there is no good reason to say that as a matter of law there was no enrichment in these cases: No doubt there will be services that I will never agree to pay for, and probably some that I would even demand payment to receive, but this is a factual matter on which the parties could present evidence. It might be argued, then, that the problem is not that there is no enrichment, but that there are great difficulties in measuring it, and that the law's response -of which there are many other examples 10 -is to have a substantive rule whose real reason is procedural. To allow parties to argue on this matter would require the defendant to prove that she has not benefited subjectively from the service, and such claims would be hard to verify. While this is a possible explanation, it is not clear that assessing the value of the enrichment in the case of services is an insurmountable obstacle. After all, there is a market for most services, and even if we assume that the recipient was unwilling to pay the market price for the service, the law's reluctance to make any effort to find the subjective value for the enrichment to the claimant may seem odd. Low as it might be, the value of the service to the claimant will almost always be more than zero. Why not allow the provider of the unconsented service restitution for this enrichment? The alternative could be that instead of denying liability in these cases, claimants would be allowed to present their case by the standards of proof of civil trial, and if they could not provide sufficient evidence of the defendant's gain from their service, they would lose their case. The assumption underlying the rule, then, is that contracts are important for individuals' autonomy because they are a vehicle for individuals to determine what shape their lives will take and perhaps also because they are a means for getting objects and services that improve individuals' well-being. And the corresponding assumption is that forcing people to pay for services they did not request will therefore negatively impact their autonomy. At first, this seems exactly in line with the argument developed in the previous section. Contract is the legal mechanism with which people can regulate their future risks, and those who avoid it when they could have used it do not deserve the law's assistance. We can imagine a spectrum at one end of which there is no contract. This case is analytically identical to a blank contract in which a provider of a service or a good takes the risk as to the willingness of the recipient to pay for service as well as the amount she will pay after the service is provided. (Of course, contract law will not enforce this kind of 'contract', and it will not do so, inter alia, for the reason Burrows mentions in the passage just quoted.) We can then imagine a series of increasingly more complete contracts, that is, contracts that take care of more aspects of the transaction: first basic aspects like price, quantity, and quality; the contracts then begin to cover possible contingencies, beginning with ones that are fairly likely (temporary shortage in the supply of a certain raw material) and end at alien invasion. The more complete is the contract, the more expensive it is (both because of increasing costs of drafting and because of the greater likelihood that the parties will disagree on something and thus fail to contract). In a sense, contracting involves investing present money for future returns where parties are given a wide range of risk versus return options:
the less one invests ex ante in making the contract, the higher is the risk that some contingency not covered in the contract will occur; but if ex post it turns out that the contingency has not occurred, then the costs incurred in adding this contingency to the contract have been a waste, and so reduced the contracting parties' returns on their investment. 17 On the other hand, the fewer the details found in the contract, the more likely it is that the parties will disagree on their respective obligations and the more difficult will it be to make factual determinations on the matter. For this reason beyond a certain point the law will not be willing to offer its (highly subsidised) service of dispute resolution to such transactions.
Against this theoretical background we can look at the question of free acceptance from a slightly different angle than usual: the question is not whether a risk-taker should be allowed to be protected by the law of restitution against the very risk he took, but rather whether an unconsented service provider should be considered a risk-taker at all. Put differently, the question that this example forces upon us is where must one stand on the spectrum just mentioned to be able to enjoy the state-provided insurance mechanism known as 'contract law'.
Neither Birks nor those debating with him explicitly discussed the question of free acceptance in terms of the limits of the law's protection of voluntary undertakings. But the point on the spectrum where one is entitled to enjoy the benefits that come from making a contract is not a law of nature: in some legal systems one can find oneself with a binding contract more easily than in others. 18 The first step in my argument will therefore be to try to show that, though this is not explicitly how the debate on free acceptance is usually framed, it is in fact better understood as concerned with this question.
To begin with, the term 'free acceptance' includes the same word familiar from contract law as the mechanism for perfecting contractual obligations. 21 In fact, when Birks specified the conditions for the imposition of liability in cases of free acceptance one of them is that the defendant 'must have known of that intent
[ie, a non-gratuitous intent] to confer a benefit'. 22 Birks later refined and qualified his earlier position and argued that the unjust factor in free acceptance is 'the unconscientious rejection of an opportunity to save the intervener from the risk he was running'. 23 This, however, seems a rather unusual position: the law does not typically impose liability on people who have an opportunity to save people from running risks. So by itself this cannot be an unjust factor. What makes this situation (if it does) unjust is the existence of a special relationship between the claimant and the defendant; and we are likely to conclude that such a relationship existed exactly in those situations in which a contract or something like it was governing their relationship so that we may conclude that each party has undertaken, explicitly or implicitly, to reduce some of the risks the other was running.
Another defender of free acceptance, Ewan McKendrick, also resorted to the language familiar from contract to describe the basis of restitutionary liability. He discussed a case in which one party delivered steel nodes to another while the parties were negotiating the terms for a contract. The contract eventually failed to materialise due to a certain disagreement between the parties and the delivering party sued. 24 McKendrick contends that the basis for liability is that the recipients 'requested steel nodes of a particular quality and in a particular . 26 This claim could be restated as questioning the desirability of expanding the law's protection to those who have behaved in a manner that imposes unnecessary costs on others and on the judicial system. For similar reasons, critics of free acceptance have referred to the limits on acceptance of contractual offers by silence, and criticised the fact that Birks's notion of free acceptance can bring in liability through a restitutionary back door after contractual liability has been denied at the front. 27 Though sceptical of the view that restitutionary liability should be imposed in cases of free acceptance, critics of the idea make it clear that something not far from it -even if not a fully-fledged contract -deserves legal protection. In determining whether restitutionary liability should be imposed, Burrows, for
example, invokes what he calls the 'bargained-for' test, which he explicitly says is supposed to cover cases of 'void, unenforceable, incomplete, or anticipated contracts'. 28 And his examples of cases in which (restitutionary) liability should be imposed when people try to subvert contractual mechanism all come from contractual settings.
Also revealing is the remedy a service provider would receive if he succeeds in a free acceptance claim.The standard remedy is quantum meruit as measured by the market price, which, when lacking any information to the contrary, is typically the price the parties would have agreed upon if they had made a contract.
Consequently, in these cases, even though formally the protected interest is restitution, the reality in practice will coincide with the expectation interest. 29 And to the extent that the recipient can challenge that price, it is by pointing to what Birks called 'subjective devaluation', ie by showing that she would only have agreed to contract for the service she received for less than the market price. Birks never considered the possibility of an opposite suggestion of 'subjective overvaluation', which suggests that he may have recognised that in a situation like this, a claimant who has already been protected from the risk of not having her claim legally recognised should bear the risk of proof of lower contractual price, even if it is one that she would not have agreed to. 30 We see then that once we ignore existing legal categories, most debate on free acceptance is in fact concerned with the boundaries of consent-based liability.
There is, however, one type of free acceptance that cannot reasonably be understood in contractual terms. In what Birks called 'secret acceptance' the recipient secretly hides at home when someone else provides her with a service. 31 When the service is complete she comes out to inform the service provider that she will not pay.This is an extremely unlikely hypothetical, and even if we thought that such a case calls for the imposition of liability, its practical relevance would be small. No-one found in a situation such this would do the one thing that could lead to liability.
Despite its practical insignificance, this case is interesting because it is the one case in which Birks believes liability should not be imposed. This is revealing, Incidentally, I think the explanation offered in the last paragraph goes some way to explaining why restitution law has flourished in English law, whereas in other countries -notably the United States -lawyers, and even more so academic lawyers, seem to be getting by without much need for it. 35 In the US, courts and commentators are much more willing to question or change established doctrine on the basis of a more open discussion of the normative considerations underlying the doctrine, 36 and perhaps as a result the rules regarding entry into contract have been eroded more than in English law. 37 As a result there was discussing more openly, and perhaps relaxing, the appropriate requirements for entry to contract. Is this therefore merely an argument over words? To some extent this may be true: so long as we reach the 'right' decisions, that is, the optimal ones by whichever normative non-legal standards we adhere to, then labels may not matter much. To take an example from a different domain, some events can be treated both as breaches of contract and as torts of negligent misrepresentation; and even though the typical contract remedy is expectation damages and the typical tort remedy is reliance damages, their measure in such instances can be quite similar if we take lost opportunities into account.
Comparative legal history likewise shows that often different legal frameworks overlapped on outcomes even when they differed in the way to get there. This is not hard to explain: legal classifications hardly ever operate in isolation from our sense of the correct disposition of the case.
Nonetheless the earlier discussion is important for it purported to rattle existing categories and to show how such categorisations can obscure discussion of the real issues at hand, as much as they sometimes help us by getting us quickly to a particular outcome. Labels send us down certain normative routes and can thus affect our judgments, especially in borderline cases when different classifications yield different outcomes. Once this is recognised, it is easier to accept the argument developed in this section, which poses an even more fundamental challenge to the boundaries of contract. It is here that the idea of quasi-contract can be particularly illuminating. Unlike the cases of free acceptance that are better explained as dealing with the limits of contract, cases of emergency service, the subject of this section, show how quasi-contractual liability is valuable exactly because they fall outside the boundaries of contract but are best explained by the relation they take to proper contractual relations.
The limits of restitutionary analysis
In a typical emergency case a person provides a service when the latter is unconscious and in mortal danger and cannot consent to the service. The question that interests us is not whether one may be liable to pay compensation if he fails to do so. On this matter, as is well known, the traditional common law answer is negative. Rather the question we are concerned with is whether one is entitled to remuneration for his services if he chooses to provide the service. Such claims have often proved successful in common law jurisdictions, and many times even when the treatment failed. 39 It is worth examining first how such cases are analysed in restitutionary terms.
Burrows offers such an account using the analysis familiar to English lawyers of locating a benefit, examining whether it was unjust and whether the enrichment is at the claimant's expense. (I disregard the question of defences.)
Examining the first two elements of restitutionary liability reveals the artificiality of the unjust enrichment route. According to Burrows, the unjust factor in this case is 'the policy-motivated desire of the law to encourage people to intervene to preserve the health and property of others'. 40 The first odd thing about this suggestion is the attempt to force it into the restitutionary category. We do not need to rely on restitutionary analysis to impose liability:
at least within the Birksian framework (that Burrows accepts) such liability could be placed within the miscellaneous category. Placing it within the category of restitutionary is justified, then, only if doing so helps understanding both of why liability is imposed and the scope of liability. In fact, it does neither.
It is hard to see how such a policy consideration could be an 'unjust factor' unless the term 'unjust factor' is stripped of all meaning. After all, any goal we wish to promote can be dubbed a 'policy' we wish to promote, and thus become an unjust factor: the performance of contracts and the prevention of accidents are also policies society may wish to promote. Recognising policy motivated unjust factors leads to the very conclusion restitutionary lawyers fought so hard against, namely that restitution is the name we give to all liability that does not fall under contract or tort. In other words, the attempt to cover rescue cases comes at the expense of completely emptying restitution law of normative coherence and undermining the main reason that has restitution scholars identify it as a distinct legal category. 41 In saying this I do not wish to deny that there are policy considerations underlying the decision to impose liability in these cases. One would think (or at least hope)
that there is some good policy behind all laws.All I wish to say is that the idea of such cases as explained by the 'policy-motivated', unjust factor does little to advance our understanding of the outcome of these cases. If we want to fit such a case within a restitutionary analysis we need to find the benefit that the recipient got from the service. What could that benefit be?
Burrows suggests that the 'the very necessity . . . suggests that the intervention was an incontrovertible negative benefit'. 43 Negative benefit is Burrows's term for having an expense one was required to pay saved because it was paid by someone else. But the question in cases of emergency is exactly what the expense that the unconsented service provided is.There are two possibilities here: one is that the 'negative benefit' is the cost of the emergency service; the other is that the 'negative benefit' is having the losses associated with the emergency prevented.According to the first interpretation, the claimant is entitled to benefit for the service she provided only if it was successful. In that case, however, her entitlement is measured by the 'negative benefit' she saved the defendant and she is entitled to a significant portion of this benefit.This is the ex post analysis.The ex ante analysis is one that does not measure whether the claimant succeeded, but whether she tried with the requisite diligence; if she did, she is entitled to the ex ante cost of that service whether or not the service turned out successful. meruit, what restitution scholars believe is the correct remedy, 44 which is typically the market price for the service provided. 45 In fact, the law provides us with an example of such an ex post rule: maritime law entitles a rescuing ship to up to 50 48 Burrows comes close to stating the quasi-contractual rationale for imposing liability: the reason why liability should be imposed in such cases is because people would have been willing to pay for the service (even without the guarantee of success), if they had had the opportunity to do so.
Within a quasi-contractual analysis it is not difficult to explain why liability need not be limited to successful attempts. In many contracts for service, the service provider does not promise a certain result, only a certain degree of effort.
If the promisor fulfils her contractual liability by performing to that level, she does not breach her contractual obligation even if the service she provides does not match a certain desired outcome. By contrast, in principle, if the promisor fails to perform to the same degree required by the contract, she breaches the contract even if the non-contracted yet desired outcome is achieved.
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The conditions for imposing quasi-contractual liability for emergencies
The previous section has shown that attempts to explain emergency rescue fail both in terms of fitting restitution to the doctrine and also in forcing upon the subject a loosening of its categories that leaves it almost devoid of normative content. In this section I aim to show that a quasi-contractual analysis can do better. A true emergency situation that should give rise to quasi-contractual liability exists in the following situation: an uncontracted-for service is provided when (a) transaction costs for the contract are prohibitively high; (b) had the service not been provided, the recipient of the service would have suffered a considerable real loss; (c) the recipient has not provided evidence to suggest that she would have declined the service if she had had the opportunity to do so; and cases to establish a market price. Further, in such cases it would be rational for the recipient to agree to pay anything for a treatment, down to the level of subsistence below which he would rather not stay alive, and because at this moment the particular service provider is a monopolist, it is possible that she will demand such a price.This implies that in such cases the recipient's willingness to pay would be strongly affected by his ability to pay, which differs considerably among people. More broadly, the latter scenario is one in which one's autonomy is compromised.As quasi-contract liability is supposed to be grounded in the same notions of autonomy that ground contractual liability, which were discussed in the beginning of this essay, clearly the first hypothetical is the one that fits it better. It is also the hypothetical that matches the liability rule proposed.
Another aspect of the proposal worth highlighting is that it does not try to identify emergency cases directly. Rather, it assumes that emergency cases are cases of 'considerable loss' (and not merely cases of foregone opportunity to make a profit) and limits recovery to them.The basis for this definition is psychological:
even though from an economic perspective a lost profit is (more or less) similar to an actual loss of similar size, people tend to react very differently to actual losses and foregone benefits. 50 The second and third conditions provide additional indirect guarantee that only true cases of emergency are captured in the definition.The claimant in such a case would have to show that transaction costs were high, or else her quasi-contractual claim would fail for not taking the contractual route when it was readily available.The third condition not only provides an easy way for the service recipient to avoid liability, but also helps identify rescue cases on the assumption that in other cases the recipient would have rejected the service. 51 Another advantage of the suggested solution over that of free acceptance is that in cases that do not fall under it, the recipient will not have to reject the service because the provider will not be able to establish the first condition.
Birks's solution requires the recipient of the service to actively reject the service or otherwise risk having to pay for it. Because the proposed alternative is more finely tailored to identify those instances in which liability should be imposed, in all non-emergency situations the recipient of a service will not have to do anything to avoid liability for unconsented services.
FAIRNESS, QUASI-CONTRACT, AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
The discussion so far has sought to establish that many debates thought to belong to restitution are in fact more easily understood as debates about the boundaries of consent-based liability, and that even the most ardent defenders of restitution, under the veneer of the jargon of restitution or unjust enrichment, engage in the debate on those terms.The surprising finding there was that if we are interested
in clear and open discussion, it is the language of restitution that is obfuscating and the language of quasi-contract that better highlights the relevant normative and doctrinal questions at hand. Those who care for the law speaking clearly would do well to return to speaking of quasi-contract. We have also seen that quasi-contractual analysis provides us with guidance when dealing with these cases, guidance that the vague and highly malleable language preferred by restitution lawyers does not. In particular we have seen that quasi-contractual analysis helps us understand why the typical remedy in rescue cases is show why this last point is wrong. One approach sought to find the answer in the cases.This approach is appealing to its proponents, for it seemed to organise and harness what beforehand looked an unruly and disparate body of case-law into a neat and highly structured framework; at the same time it enabled its proponents to think that in engaging in this kind of inquiry they were doing 'pure' legal analysis, unadulterated by alien ideas coming from moral philosophy, economics or other disciplines.
The leading proponent of this approach was Peter Birks who defended it against 'realism', 52 and who once wrote that in trying to explain restitution one should favour an approach that is 'downward-looking to the cases'. 53 There is a growing sense that this approach has failed, and in retrospect it is not difficult to when trying to address this question it will be useful to understand the sort of normative considerations that seem to be at play at the second level. In this sort of inquiry getting a firmer grasp on the pre-theoretical, moral intuitions at play is likely to prove useful, and since these matters have been subject to important empirical work in recent years it would be helpful to consider them here. 55 Work in this area has identified what are believed to be the five basic components of interpersonal morality: harm, fairness, in-group loyalty, hierarchy, and purity. 56 The most relevant in the present context are norms of fairness. In the course of a discussion that has little to do with unjust enrichment Daniel Kahneman and his colleagues suggested that '[t]he cardinal rule of fair behavior is surely that one person should not achieve gain by simply imposing an equivalent loss on another'. 57 Though this description seems to capture the 'core case' of mistaken payment, 58 it also captures (at least in general outline) other areas of the law that are not traditionally considered part of unjust enrichment (like the tort of conversion) and property (claims of vindication) as well as at least some aspects of breach of contract. As such, it does not help us identify unjust enrichment as a distinct area of law.
However, the psychological literature on fairness is useful in going beyond such fact situations to cases deemed unfair when one person takes advantage of circumstances in ways that do not impose real loss on another. Experimental studies on the ultimatum game are the classic example: in these experiments one of two players is given a sum of money (known to both).The first player is then requested to offer as much as she wishes from that sum to the other player.The second player, in turn, can either accept the offer, in which case she takes what she was offered and the first takes the remainder, or reject the offer, in which case both players get nothing. Experimental studies found that considerations of fairness often constrain both the initial offer and the decision whether to accept or reject it. Offers were typically equal or close to equal, and in cases where they
were not, the recipient many times elected to reject the offer and thus forego a benefit (an 'incontrovertible benefit' in the language of restitution lawyers) in order to 'punish' behaviour deemed unfair. 59 I believe it is these sentiments, and not a theory of corrective justice, that lie behind many of the doctrines nowadays usually classified as part of the law of restitution. To put it differently (and reinforce a point made above), whatever appeal the principle of corrective justice may have, it is one that derives from the fact that it seems to restore fairness in some cases of (perceived) unfairness. Fairness is, however, unpopular in some circles, so much so that many wish to eliminate it altogether from legal and political discourse. 61 It is blamed for being both vague and undesirable for leading to unwanted outcomes. Our first task, therefore, is to provide a definition of fairness that is sufficiently precise and relevant to the current discussion. I propose the following definition, limited as it is to the context under consideration: a fair award for a good or service is one that corresponds, in the sense that it is neither considerably higher nor considerably lower, to other awards for similar goods or services.
There are various ambiguities (eg, is a snow shovel in the middle of the summer similar to a snow shovel a day after a snow storm?) and limitations to this definition (are fairness norms inapplicable when there is no basis for comparison?). At the level of moral intuition, which is my focus here, I doubt there is much I can say about them. What interests me is to show why liability is more likely to be imposed in the cases I classified as quasi-contract than in some other cases that may also involve questions of fairness.What makes quasicontract cases unique is that typically they call for the imposition of liability in situations that imitate efficient transactions, and as such they will be easier cases to accept even for those who are not friends of fairness in general.
This point requires a bit more elaboration: typical contracts are both efficient and fair. They are efficient because normally (ie, barring negative externalities and assuming moderate rationality and knowledge of the contracting parties) they will be entered where both parties stand to benefit from them. They are also fair because they are typically entered into in a market setting that (once again assuming moderate rationality of the contracting parties) will guarantee the fairness of the transaction. The emergency cases I propose to analyse as instances of liability for quasi-contract are those which are close enough to contractual cases so that we have sufficient reason to think that the imposition of liability in these cases will conform to both norms of fairness and the goal of efficiency.
This point helps us see the motivation behind many of the cases at the margin of contract that were discussed in the first section, and why liability is more likely to be imposed in the emergency cases discussed above than in some other cases that look superficially quite similar to them. Take, for example, cases of mistaken services and mistaken improvements. These typically take one of two forms: (a) A contracts with B to provide her with a service; B mistakenly provides the service to C; (b) D improves what she mistakenly thinks is her property but which in fact belongs to E.These cases are similar to unconsented services cases, but are more complicated than them in that in neither of these imaginary scenarios has there been an attempt to circumvent the market. In addition, these cases are similar to cases of mistaken payment in that they (may) involve two innocent parties; they are, however, more complicated than mistaken payment cases, because in such scenarios typically the service provided cannot be undone.
Clearly the quasi-contractual analysis proposed above cannot be the basis for imposing liability in such cases. Can there be a different basis for the imposition of liability in these cases? This, if you want, is where we could define the domain of unjust enrichment beyond that of quasi-contract (rather than quasi-contract being part of unjust enrichment).Any defender of the idea of unjust enrichment as a separate basis for liability must answer this question affirmatively, for it is cases such as this in which fairness is exclusive justification for the imposition of legal liability. There are legal decisions imposing liability in such situations, 62 they are more controversial than cases of emergency. My suspicion is that, just as in the case of quasi-contract, successful claims will usually involve more than just fairness. Examples of that extra ingredient could be positive evidence of lack of negligence on part of the claimant and evidence that her actions in no way are an attempt to circumvent the market; some sort of fault on the part of the defendant (eg, in marking the boundaries of her property); the existence of some kind of proprietary interest and so on. If that is the case, that would suggest, consistent with the views of some unjust enrichment sceptics, that rather than an independent area of law explained by a unifying principle of unjust enrichment, the cases treated as belonging to the area of unjust enrichment are better understood as demonstrating the role of fairness as an auxiliary consideration that influences doctrines in tort, contract, and property law, rather than providing an independent basis for legal liability.
These are obviously tentative remarks on a broad topic. All they are meant to show is how the notion of quasi-contract helps us not only understand what falls underneath it, but also what falls outside of it, and how might such cases be treated.
CONCLUSION
Let me summarise what thinking about the margins of consent-based liability has taught us about certain cases usually treated as examples of liability for unjust enrichment. First, we have seen why the general rule was that there was no liability for unconsented services. We have seen that while in the case of mistaken payments or the mistaken provision of material objects in kind there is no danger that requiring the recipient to give up her benefit will somehow undermine the contractual foundations of the market system. I have then argued that what is at stake in the debate on free acceptance is the scope of consent-based liability, which, of course, is also the foundation of contractual liability. Based on these considerations I have argued that if we elect to impose liability in such circumstances there are good reasons for calling it quasi-contractual. This is not merely a helpful reminder to the general normative area in which this kind of liability belongs, but also a source of inspiration and borrowing: contract doctrine and contract theory are more elaborately developed and detailed than restitutionary doctrine and theory, and there are good reasons for examining them when considering the related area of free acceptance. Then, I
have sought to explain how quasi-contractual liability helps us understand why in cases of emergency the law departs from its general policy of denial of liability for unconsented services, because, as in the case of mistaken payments, such cases do not typically increase the likelihood that people will abandon contracting as the usual method for acquiring goods and services. More importantly, I have argued that quasicontractual liability helps us understand two otherwise puzzling aspects of the law: first, why certain emergency cases did not limit liability to successful services; and second, why the level of compensation is measured at the market value of the service provided and not related to the value of the benefit gained by the service. In all this, the term 'quasi-contract', despite its quaint sound, is helpful in conveying something that the new terminology of restitution and unjust enrichment does not.
In the end I also suggested more tentatively that this discussion may be helpful clear in what sense such a liability would go beyond -and therefore would be more difficult to justify than -quasi-contractual liability. Whether this liability could ever be justified is a matter for another occasion.
